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Abstract  
This paper examines the SMEs performance in Zambia and attempts to identify some 
practical lessons that Zambia can learn from Southeast Asian countries (with reference to 
Malaysia) in order to facilitate industrial development through unlocking the potential of its 
SMEs sector. Malaysia and Zambia were at the same level of economic development as 
evidenced by similar per capita incomes but Zambia has remained behind economically and 
its manufacturing sector has stagnated as if both countries did not have similar initial 
endowments. It therefore, becomes imperative that Zambia learns from such countries on 
how they managed to take-off economically with a focus on SME development. Training 
(education), research & development, market availability and technological advancement 
through establishment of industrial linkages coupled with cluster formation were some of the 
outstanding strategies identified that Zambia could use as a “key” to unlock its SMEs’ 
potential as it strives to meet the UN MDGs in particular halving its poverty levels by 2015 
and also realizing its vision of becoming a middle income earner by 2030. 
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１．Introduction 
There is no doubt that most African countries depend on their Micro, Small and 
Medium Enterprise (SMEs) in driving their economies forward. However, most of these 
SMEs receive lukewarm support from their governments. Nevertheless, a few 
competitive SMEs are thriving and contributing to economic growth, employment 
creation and local development in combating poverty. 
The private sector has become the centre of concern in today’s globalised world 
and hence a number of African countries have withdrawn from running the nation’s 
economic activities and have moved to a more competitive market economy where a 
sizeable portion of the nation’s economy is being run by the private sector. The private 
sector has thus been recognized as an engine for economic growth not only in African 
countries but also in Asian as well as other countries. It is against this background that 
most countries are now implementing policies that are centered on creating a vibrant 
business environment for the private sector to flourish.  
Talking about the private sector development as one of the solutions to Africa’s 
deprived economy, it is a well known fact that Africa’s private sector consists mostly of 
informal SMEs operating along side with large firms hence concerted efforts need to 
focus on unlocking the potential of these SMEs so that they contribute meaningfully to 
the nation’s economic growth alas, a common error made by most countries in Africa is 
that, they tend to target large companies at the expense of SMEs, however, they do not 
realize that good environment for large scale enterprise may not be favorable for SMEs 
but if there is a good environment for SMEs then it will also be favorable for large 
companies. In addition, since SMEs are responsible for a larger percentage of the 
manufacturing sector in sub-Saharan Africa; Fukunishi (2004), Bigsten and Soderbom 
(2005) cited from Sonobe et al (2006) found the sub-Saharan Africa manufacturing 
sector to be stagnant due to different factors hindering its growth. 
As a country, Zambia has been struggling on how it can best address the issues 
that constrain the SMEs from performing at the frontier. For a long time now, as stated 
earlier, not only in Zambia but even in other African countries, the manufacturing sector 
which mainly consists of the SMEs has been stagnant. The Ministry of Commerce, 
Trade and Industry, (MCTI), Zambia manufacturing sector survey (2003) found that the 
SMEs sector in Zambia has stagnated due to a number of barriers hindering its growth.  
The above point becomes worrisome to the Zambian situation, as we expect the 
SMEs to be the driving force for economic growth and wealth creation. In fact, UNIDO 
in its Industrial Development Report (2004) has argued that wealth creation strategies 
have a multiplier effect in economies dominated by SMEs than those dominated by 
large-scale firms. Therefore, if the status quo is to be maintained, Zambia will remain in 
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the vicious circle of poverty and low per capita income.  
On the other hand, investors or large-scale firms, it be foreign or domestic, look at 
the reliability of the supporting industries before they make their investment decisions 
as they consider supporting industries (SMEs) to be a very important determinant for 
the success of their businesses. Perhaps this is why most Southeast Asian countries have 
concentrated much in developing their home grown enterprises which in turn have 
attracted more Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). For example Singapore, Korea and 
Malaysia which receive considerably high levels of FDI, have focused much on 
developing their SMEs sector, which was one of the strategies used for their industrial 
development. It is therefore, important that Zambia takes a leaf from these Southeast 
Asian countries that have succeeded in developing their SMEs during their process of 
industrialization and see whether it could replicate some of the programmes and policies 
as it strives to meet some of the Millennium Development Goals in particular halving its 
poverty levels by 2015.  
Nevertheless, Zambia has not been left behind in regards to where attracting FDI 
is concerned, Zambia’s FDI inflows has been soaring in response to the good 
macroeconomic environment the country is currently enjoying. Its FDI inflows has sky 
rocketed from an annual average of 165 Million USD (UNCTAD, 2005) to about 1.4 
Billion USD inflows for the year 2007 according to the Minister in charge of Commerce, 
Trade and Industry Hon. Felix Mutati, MP (Africa Press International, 2007). With these 
FDI inflows Zambia has now become the second largest receipt of FDI in sub-Saharan 
Africa after South Africa. The biggest investments have been in manufacturing, 
agricultural, mining and tourism. Refer to table 1 and figure 1 below showing the sector 
by sector total investments and their shares to total investments respectively. Since these 
investments consists mainly the Multi-National Corporations (MNCs), this is a clear 
indication that policies favoring MNCs are bearing fruits going by the current levels of 
FDI inflows to Zambia. Nevertheless, to sustain the MNCs’ businesses, there is need to 
develop the supporting industries, in this case the SMEs. Therefore, besides the 
pro-MNCs policies, it is imperative that favorable policies and programmes that support 
the SMEs are put in place. By having a developed supply chain, MNCs will specialize 
and concentrate on their core businesses and in return the country could benefit from 
higher productivities. 
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Table 1: Total Investment Approvals and Employment in Zambia. 1993 - 2006 
Sectors Total Investments (US $) Total Employment 
Manufacturing 1,402,656,791 73,785 
Agriculture 643,354,224 78,881 
Service 748,636,802 15,759 
Mining 485,301,725 15,117 
Construction 271,696,980 11,190 
Consultancy 943,032 134 
Engineering 8,237,089 421 
Financial Institutions 5,604,975 483 
Fisheries 9,009,036 1,918 
Health 10,340,799 695 
Tourism 341,644,363 11,851 
Transport 197,692,949 4,293 
Source: ZDA, 2007 
Figure 1: Share of sectors to Total Investments in Zambia 
1993-2006
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As shown in figure 1 above, Zambia has been receiving most of its investments in 
the manufacturing sector amounting to 34% of the total investments, followed by the 
services sector at 18%, agriculture sector at 16% and mining sector at 12% according to 
Source: ZDA, 2007 
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the Zambia Development Agency (ZDA) data of 1993 to 2006. These are somewhat 
surprising figures as we expected more investments in the mining sector considering the 
fact that Zambia is a natural resource (mining) driven economy. However, it should be 
noted that these are not actual but approved figures that only capture companies 
licensed by ZDA hence other mining investments that did not go through Zambia 
Investment Centre now ZDA may not have been captured, nevertheless, it gives a rough 
indication that there are a number of manufacturing MNCs that need support from the 
locals – the SMEs. 
Zambia is currently among the poorest countries in the world, according to the 
World Bank (2004), about 70 percent of the population lives below the poverty line of 1 
US Dollar per day. Hence the development of the private sector in Zambia through 
unlocking the potential of SMEs can not be over emphasized. 
Using secondary data, this paper attempts to review the SMEs sector in Zambia 
and examine the major constraints that have led to its stagnation. It will further examine 
the pro- SMEs programmes and policies that were implemented by the Southeast Asian 
countries with reference to Malaysia during its industrialization process and recommend 
those that could directly be replicated to Zambia bearing in mind the differences in the 
levels of economic development. It is wise to refer to the Southeast Asian countries such 
as Malaysia because of its past economic history, which is much similar to that of 
Zambia’s. Both countries had similar initial endowments in terms of natural resources, 
actually in 1960 and 1970s both countries had almost the same level of economies with 
similar per capita incomes (see figure 3). While Malaysia had Rubber Trees and Tin as 
its main natural resources, Zambia had Copper and Cobalt. But Zambia has remained 
behind in terms of economic development, while Malaysia is now one of the most 
industrialized countries actually, an upper middle income country which is targeting at 
becoming a fully developed country by the year 2020. One of the areas that were 
identified that contributed to the Malaysia’s success story is the way they supported 
their home grown industries, the SMEs. It is undoubtedly that best practices were taken 
on board by most Southeast Asian countries in terms of supporting their SMEs sector 
during their process of industrialization and as such, it would be useful for policy 
makers in Zambia to learn from their experiences. Besides the above mentioned facts, 
my study is further inspired by the “Triangle of Hope Initiative” which is currently 
being implemented in Zambia. The initiative tries to replicate the Malaysian economic 
model to different sectors of the Zambian economy, therefore, this paper will provide 
some specific policy implications that Zambia may consider as it implements this 
initiative.  
There has been scanty literature on Zambian SMEs, most studies undertaken on 
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SMEs have generalized their scope as they have either focused on sub-Saharan Africa or 
the African continent as a whole rather than country specific studies. Mazumdar and 
Mazaheri (2003) used the so-called Regional Program on Enterprise Development 
(RPED) data to review the African manufacturing sector that included Zambia. In their 
paper, although they targeted at large companies, they tried to decompose their data into 
micro, small, medium, large and very large companies based on the number of 
employees to categorize the different firm size groups. They observed that African 
SMEs were not operating at full potential as evidenced by the low Technical 
Efficiencies they deduced. Furthermore, Mbuta (2007) undertook a study on the SMEs 
sector with an aim to recommend policies for development of SMEs in Zambia. 
However, none of the above authors attempted to bring on board lessons that could be 
learnt from countries whose SMEs sector is vibrant such as the Southeast Asian nations 
where SMEs make up more than 90 percent of industries (Beyene, 2002). It is in this 
connection that, the objective of my study is to analyze and review the SMEs sector in 
Zambia and extract best practice lessons from the Southeast Asian countries (in 
particular Malaysia) that would be applicable to the Zambian situation and those that 
may have a greater impact on the SMEs’ contribution to economic growth. I will mainly 
focus on the SMEs manufacturing sector since it is in this sector that industrial vacuum 
is most feared, although I will also try to review both the Zambian and Southeast Asian 
industrial policies since they have a direct bearing on the strength of SMEs. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: chapter 2 reviews and analyses the 
SMEs policy in Zambia, chapter 3 focuses on the industrial policy of Zambia since it 
has a direct impact on the SMEs sector, chapter 4 examines and analyses the industrial 
policies and programmes of Southeast Asian countries the so-called the Asian Tigers 
with a focus on Malaysia, chapter 5 outlines the lessons that can be learned from the 
Southeast Asian experience and finally chapter 6 concludes the paper. 
2.  Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises in Zambia  
2.1. What are they? 
There is no universally accepted definition of Micro, Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs). Each country defines SMEs in a different way according its 
economic position, among others. However, there is need to have an appropriate 
definition that reflects the real situation on the ground. A number of SMEs do not access 
legislative provisions for SMEs such as finance and other facilities because they do not 
fall in the bracket of the national definition though in the actual fact they may qualify to 
be called SMEs and on the other hand, other enterprises maybe mature enough and may 
not require direct government intervention hence the right definition ensures that only 
those enterprises which genuinely require support are targeted by public schemes.  
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Zambia is in the process of revising its SME definitions to make them much more 
effective in addressing the emerging challenges that the sector faces. Nevertheless, the 
Small Enterprises Development (SED) Act of 1996 defines SMEs as follows: 
Firstly, an enterprise is defined as an undertaking engaged in the manufacture or 
provisions of services or any undertaking carrying out business in the field of 
manufacturing, construction and trading services but does not include mining or 
recovery of minerals.  
Micro: - an enterprise whose total investment excluding land and buildings does 
not exceed 50 million Zambian Kwacha; annual turnover that does not exceed 20 
million Zambian Kwacha and employing up to 10 persons (note that the current 
exchange rate is 1 US = 3, 737 ZMK). 
Small:- an enterprise whose total investment excluding land and buildings does 
not exceed 50 million Zambian Kwacha, in case of manufacturing and processing 
enterprise and 10 million  Zambian Kwacha in case of a trading and service enterprise; 
an annual turnover that does not exceed 80 million Zambian Kwacha and employing up 
to 30 people. 
The act does not provide the definition of medium enterprise.  
SMEs business activities are mainly in 4 sectors namely Manufacturing, Trading, 
Services and Mining although small scale miners are not considered as SMEs according 
to the Zambian legislation. The following table depicts the SMEs activities in the above 
named sectors. 
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Table 2: Business Activities of SMEs in Zambia 
 Manufacturing 
Textile products 
Carpentry and other wood based 
business 
Light engineering and Metal 
Fabrication 
Food Processing 
Leather products 
Handicrafts 
Processing of semi precious stones 
Essential Oils 
Ceramics 
Trading 
Consumable products 
Industrial Products 
Agricultural inputs 
Agricultural produce 
Printing 
 
Services 
Restaurants and food production 
Hair salons and Barbershops 
Passenger and goods transport  
Telecommunication services 
Financial Services 
Business Centers 
Cleaning Services 
Guest Houses 
       Building and Construction 
 
Mining 
Small scale mining 
Small scale quarrying 
 
 
 
2.2. Background 
After attaining independence in 1964, Zambia had no policy on the private sector 
development in particular the SMEs. It had no special legal framework promoting the 
SMEs since the economy was enjoying the high prices of copper hence ignoring SME 
sector. The country depended much on mining copper and only the public sector was 
visible by then. Unfortunately, the copper prices collapsed in 1975 and at the same time 
the oil prices soared. With decreasing profitability in the copper business, the Zambian 
government had to find alternative ways of sustaining its economy therefore, after 1981, 
it begun to initiate policies targeted at promoting SMEs and hence came up with the 
Small Industries Development Act of 1981 succeeded by the Small Enterprises 
Development (SED) Act of 1996. Both policies had a negligible impact on the 
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development of SMEs as they were just merely public pronouncements with little effort 
to implement them.  
In the past, Zambians were not very enterprising due to the public sector led 
economic growth model which excluded them from participating in business activities 
with the threat of nationalization if an enterprise grow beyond a certain size as such, 
Zambian people depended entirely on formal employment as a way of earning income. 
However, after the 1990s, when Zambia adopted the free market economy that were 
perpetuated by the World Bank (the so called Washington Consensus) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), it experienced the most severe economic recession. 
The drastic opening up of the domestic market to cheap and somewhat high quality 
products left inefficient local producers uncompetitive, hence it became imperative that 
they had to restructure so as to remain in business and laying out of workers was one of 
the methods used while other firms closed down operations completely. The opening up 
of the markets coupled with privatization of the state owned mines (and firms) acted as 
a ‘double edged sword’ that left a number of citizens unemployed. The Gross Domestic 
Product declined and poverty levels increased drastically (70%) placing Zambia among 
the poorest countries in the word. The formation of SMEs were inevitable since most 
Zambians were now out of formal employment and they had to find other means of 
surviving, also because of the availability of the market from poor people who preferred 
to buy goods and services from SMEs that were not so expensive with reasonable 
quality. The SMEs have however, struggled to graduate and have remained stagnant. 
Even after the expiry of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) (2000 – 2004) 
(which ran in tandem with the Transitional National Development Plan, 2002 – 2005) 
that placed the SMEs as one of the instruments to economic recovery, employment 
creation and poverty reduction, the SMEs sector has remained marginalized and poverty 
levels are still high. 
2.3  Significance of SMEs in Zambia 
SMEs are the engine of every nation’s economy as they occupy a prominent 
position in the development of many countries in the world be it least developed, 
developing and developed countries. Contributions of SMEs can be well noted in a 
number of aspects including labor absorption, creation of entrepreneurial spirit and 
innovation, promotion of linkages and complementary role to large companies, wealth 
creation, among others. In “The theory of Economic Development” Schumpeter (1912) 
emphasized the role of entrepreneur, as a prime cause of economic development, being 
this development achieved through innovation. Therefore, it is evident that SMEs have 
been considered to be very vital in any society as early as the beginning of the 20th 
century. At the local level, SMEs seem to be perfect and an important piece for local 
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development since they have a greater flexibility and ability to change and to respond 
quickly to changing market demand and supply situations. 
In Zambia, SMEs constitute 95 percent of all firms yet most of them are 
marginalized. Most large enterprises in Zambia are final goods producers which make 
them well recognized since their products reach the final consumers directly.  
Furthermore, the number of employees by the SMEs also highlights the significance of 
SMEs in the economy.  It is estimated that only 500,000 (12.5%) of the potential labor 
force of 4,000,000 Zambians are in formal employment. The remaining 3,500,000 
(87.5 %) are engaged in informal employment (SMEs). There is also some evidence that 
SMEs have generated skills transfer among themselves more especially in the few 
available clusters such as in the garment sector. The predominance of SMEs is also 
translated into their contribution to the production value in the manufacturing sector 
unfortunately, due to scanty information and data I could not quantify the current value 
added created by SMEs, however, Mbuta (2007) indicated that in 1996, the SME sector 
produced value added amounting to K 85.7 billion (constant 1994 prices) out of the total 
GDP of K 2,328.1 billion representing 3.7 percent. He also estimated that the sector 
contributed 4.7 percent of the total GDP in the same year. Actually most of the SMEs in 
Zambia are in an informal state and hence are not captured by the Central Statistics 
Office therefore, their contribution and also the national GDP may somewhat be under 
estimated. This has in return denied government the much needed revenue as most of 
the SMEs do not remit taxes. As for the exports, very few SMEs are involved in the 
production of commercial goods and services and as such they have a negligible 
contribution to the total exports of Zambia, actually most of them operate at a level of 
output that is too small to even sufficiently exhaust scale economies. The MCTI (2003) 
survey reported that 2% of the total SMEs (of which 64 percent were engaged in 
manufacturing) exported their goods mainly to the neighboring countries.   
Nevertheless, SMEs have been depicted as ‘an army for ants’ for Zambia more 
especially after the liberalization and privatization of the economy. 
2.4 Status of SMEs in Zambia  
For SMEs to have a more positive impact on any nation’s economy, 
entrepreneurship in SMEs must be seen on the enterprise start ups, as well as on the 
enterprise growth. This growth may be the source for more entrepreneurship through 
spill-overs to the firm, and because it can originate some spill-offs, that will contribute 
to economic development. However, SMEs require special attention for them to 
graduate to larger firms. Most SMEs in Zambia have been at a micro level since 
inception some decade years ago. This stagnation is not only caused by the lack of 
effective public policy to support SMEs but also the entrepreneur’s characteristics such 
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as poor educational backgrounds. Mazumdar and Mazaheri (2003) found that only 
13.4% of micro entrepreneurs in Zambia have at least completed vocational training 
which is regarded as an important tool for the growth of their firms. However, the 
impact of poor education is envisaged to be minimal in the coming years as most 
entrepreneurs are engaging their children who have been schooled enough to run their 
businesses. Furthermore, some entrepreneurs in Zambia would rather not want to grow 
because they try to evade tax which becomes difficult once they are formalized. As a 
consequence, most of them prefer opening other micro companies instead of expanding 
the existing ones hence missing out on advantages of scale economies. Formality is 
primarily associated with business registration, getting premises and opening bank 
accounts. Other reasons that discourage SMEs to formalize include: administrative 
barriers, corruption in public places, socio-cultural attitudes and criminality as some of 
them are involved in some illegal activities such as selling of smuggled goods, dealing 
in stolen goods, employing under age workers or engaged in illegal activities such as 
brothel prostitution business or pornographic movies which are prohibited under the 
Zambian law (Mbuta, 2007). This explains why 55% of micro enterprises in Zambia are 
unregistered (MCTI Survey, 2003).  
Nevertheless, there have been very few companies that started as micro and are 
now operating as medium mainly not because of good public policies but their 
successes are more attributed to the private sector dynamism and external circumstances. 
The entrepreneur’s characteristics such as education and innovational skills do play a 
vital role in as far as entrepreneurship is concerned. If one happens to ask these 
enterprises how they have managed to grow, they will hardly mention government as its 
partner in their success. Therefore, there is need for government to pull up its socks and 
create a more favorable business environment so that more SMEs are graduated to 
larger enterprises which in turn will create more wealth for Zambians and contribute to 
the nation’s economic development. 
 
2.5  Constraints faced by Zambian SMEs 
Despite the macroeconomic reforms undertaken by the government aimed at 
macroeconomic stabilization i.e. liberalization, privatization among others, the SMEs 
sector has not yet significantly benefited from them. There have been a number of 
constraints that have hindered the growth of SMEs in Zambia. The Task Force on SMEs 
in Zambia (2006) identified some of the constraints affecting the Zambian SMEs as: 
  (i) Inadequate Policy Frame Work  
• Although in Zambia’s industrial policy, the existence of the informal SME 
sector is recognized, the references made to the promotion and 
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development of SMEs mainly refer to improving goods and services in the 
formal sector but not those found in the micro and informal sub-sector, the 
situation is further exacerbated by the absence of a comprehensive and 
stand alone policy framework to give direction to efforts and plans aimed 
at supporting this huge sector. This is therefore a serious constraint on the 
development of the SME sector in Zambia. 
• The Zambia Development Agency (ZDA) Act of 2006, which is the current 
statute covering the promotion and facilitation of investments in Zambia, is 
far beyond the reach of most SMEs, because  under this Act, incentives 
are granted to only those investors with qualifying Assets of US$500,000 
and above.  
It is evident through most economic policy documents, that the sector is not a 
focus area of most policy makers, and yet a lot of pronounced or documented 
socio-economic policies have direct or indirect effects on the SME sector. 
For example Municipal authorities rely heavily on SMEs for their income but 
they do not consider how their policy on fees/levies might relate to 
construction/maintenance of physical infrastructure (roads, markets), or promotional 
measures for the sector.  The fact that the policy makers and implementers have 
difficulties in understanding the sector, poses a great development question. It means 
that it will take time to convince urban authorities about the need to change their 
attitude and accept informal sector entrepreneurs as agents for development, 
income-generation and employment creation in both urban and rural areas of the 
economy as a whole. 
(ii)  Difficulties in filling capacity Gaps for SMEs 
It is important to note that the biggest difficulty in entrepreneurship development 
is related to the “mindset” or poverty of the mind.  This is translated into the 
following symptoms: 
? Poor work culture in public offices, organizations, households and in 
individual personal lives;     
? An attitude of dependency: always expecting government/donor to come up 
with packages;  
? Apathy, believing that we are poor, failing to see potentials that are waiting to 
be tapped;  
? Lack of commitment to desired mission (putting short sighted self interest first 
and; 
? Corruption. 
The policy-related and institutional constraints outlined above have also had a 
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direct bearing on the difficulties of filling capacity gaps which is a prerequisite for 
Zambian firms to survive and grow in the market place. Analysis of the SME sector in 
Zambia (MCTI, 2003) indicates severe deficiencies in basic management and technical 
skills relating to the following fundamental areas: 
• Strategic management capacities i.e. the ability to manage entry into new 
markets and organizing labour and capital to respond to the changing markets, 
technologies and regulations. Such skills are usually acquired through family 
experience, or through formal education in business strategy development, 
followed by associated experience in modern firms; 
• Functional management skills i.e. skills required in production, finance, 
purchasing and marketing to improve production of capital, quality control etc; 
• Technical management skills i.e. the actual technical know how to achieve the 
required quality and quantity. 
In addition, there has been limited emphasis towards addressing the obvious 
bottlenecks that impede the development of SMEs, which include: 
• Ineffective and uncoordinated support schemes to effectively encourage SMEs 
to meet both local and export markets; 
• Inadequate information resources on trade, investment, technology, training 
and application of quality control etc; 
• Inaccessibility to finance/long-term credit: The MCTI survey (2003) revealed 
that only 7.2% of Zambian SMEs had access to credit while the majority used 
their personal savings to start up a business. Furthermore, due to high default 
rates by SMEs, commercial banks favor large firms as regards to credit lending. 
The government of Zambia through the Bank of Zambia has however, put in 
the place the Credit Reference Bureau that reduces the market imperfections 
such as asymmetric information between the borrowers and lenders as it tracks 
the credit culture of SMEs, but the problem comes to new SMEs who would 
want to enter the market without any records to track hence they still remain 
marginalized. 
These are somewhat “traditional constraints” that are faced by most SMEs not 
only in Africa but also in much developed countries. However, countries in Southeast 
Asia have directed most of their funding to the SME sector unlike the case of some 
African countries that mostly wait for the donor community to approach them and 
solve their problems. Quite alright the donors do come to their rescue but donor 
driven programs are sometimes not sustainable. 
Any country’s industrial policy has a bearing on the operations of the SMEs sector 
and as such it is important to review the industrial policy of Zambia and deduce the 
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implications it has on the SMEs sector. The following section will discuss the current 
industrial policy that is being implemented by the Zambian government. 
3 The Industrial Policy of Zambia 
Currently Zambia does not have a comprehensive industrial policy but of course 
the industry is guided by fragmented policies. Nevertheless, Zambia drafted a 
Commercial, Trade and Industrial (CTI) policy in 1994 but it underwent several 
revisions to suite the current macroeconomic situation. The draft policy is yet to be 
approved. However, the draft policy anticipates an expanding manufacturing sector 
which will contribute to about 20% of GDP as compared to the current 11 %. It also 
aims at developing a competitive and export-led manufacturing sector. The policy has 
recognized the importance of SME sector in realization of its vision. Weak supporting 
industries (SMEs) would negatively affect the industrialization process hence the policy 
has provisions that are inline with needs of SMEs, however, they are not specific in their 
provisions.     
In 2004, Zambia launched the Private Sector Development (PSD) program aimed 
at providing an enabling environment for private sector economic activity. The PSD 
program is a clear testimony of the recognition of the Private Sector as a key partner and 
player in the development of the Zambian economy. One of the reform areas in the PSD, 
the local economic empowerment has taken on board the needs of SMEs and it is 
envisaged that unlocking the SMEs’ potential through capacity building and provision 
of funds will be undertaken. 
Zambia is in the process of implementing what is called the Multi-Facility 
Economic Zones (MFEZ) which is generally targeted at large and hi-tech companies. 
The MFEZs will have the necessary infrastructure for easy commencement of business 
activities. Companies that will operate in the MFEZs will qualify for special incentives 
such as exemption from paying corporate tax for a period up to 5 years and also 
exemption from paying import duties for intermediate goods and raw materials among 
others as stipulated in the ZDA Act of 2006 and the MFEZ regulations (2006). This is a 
welcome initiative! However, to generate larger rewards for the economy from such 
projects there is need to develop the supply chain mainly the SMEs. The importation of 
raw materials duty free may injure the SMEs who supply similar goods to the large 
companies as they will become uncompetitive in terms of pricing. It would be prudent if 
the MFEZ law encouraged the MFEZ companies to source a certain percentage of raw 
materials and intermediate goods from the home grown enterprises as long as the 
materials are available and of acceptable quality. Furthermore, since non- exporting 
MFEZ firms will also enjoy the same benefits as exporting MFEZ firms, this may injure 
the domestic industries (both large and small) that depend on local inputs because of 
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production cost differences that will favor MFEZ firms. According to UNCTAD (2006), 
this discrimination against small investors could be avoided by reducing the overall tax 
levels and rationalizing the incentive scheme as a way of stimulating both local and 
foreign investment. As of today, two MFEZs in Lusaka and the Copperbelt provinces 
have since been identified and will be developed by a Malaysian and Chinese Company 
respectively. The MFEZ is the outcome of the Triangle of Hope initiative which is 
currently been supported jointly by the government of Zambia and the Japanese 
government through the Japan International Corporation Agency (JICA). 
The above policies are anchored on the Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) 
which is a principal national document that outlines strategies and programs to be 
implemented from 2006 to 2011. The FNDP acknowledges the SMEs potential on 
creation of employment and wealth and has proposed a more general approach to tackle 
some of the constraints faced by the sector.  
The following chapter will review the industrial policy of the Southeast Asian 
countries the so-called the Asian Tigers. It is critical to look at a broader perspective of 
how these countries implemented their policies during the industrialization process that 
resulted into the “East Asian Miracle” and also to try to avoid what led their economic 
boom to burst. 
4. Industrial Policies and Programmes of Southeast Asian Countries  
It is ironic that Asia, which was twice as poor as Africa 50 years ago, has become 
twice as rich. Asian countries seem to be doing fine in the global economy partly 
because they have invested heavily in technology and have been oriented to various 
skills. In the 1960s and 1970s sub- Saharan Africa’s per capita income was better than 
that of Southeast Asia （see Perkins and Roemer, 1994）albeit, Southeast Asia greatly 
surpassed sub-Saharan Africa after the 1990s (see figure 2 below).  Africa needs to 
learn from Southeast Asia how they have managed to develop economically.  
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Figure 2 : Real GDP Per Capita, Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa, 1960 to 2005
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As shown in figure 2 above, the taking-off of the Southeast Asian economy is 
mostly is attributed to one of the most intriguing and compelling issues in the global 
economic and social development efforts of the past popularly known as the “East Asian 
Miracle”. By definition, the East-Asian miracle describes a process of unprecedented 
economic growth which occurred in the mid-seventies to early and mid-nineties 
(Offiong and Ero, 2002). This was a period when a tremendous economic recovery was 
experienced by eight East Asian countries, among them, Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia within a period of about two decades 
(1970s to 1990s) as depicted in figure 2 above. During this period, these Asian countries 
adopted favorable policies mostly in the industrial sector that may be of interest to most 
developing countries that are struggling for economic take-off. Obviously not forgetting 
that the miracle was not permanent, it collapsed in the mid 1990s and as such those 
countries trying to learn from this experience have to bear in mind what caused its down 
fall so as to avoid the same happening to their economies. Some of the notable factors 
responsible for the fall of the East Asian Miracle were: falling international trade, profits 
and capital flight among others which I may not go into details (see Ito, 1993). 
By examining the above success stories, Zambia may pick one or two strategies to 
Source: WDI, World Bank 2006 
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resuscitate its economy although the focus is much more on the SME sector. I will also 
concentrate much on the past economic history of these countries since it is that time 
they were struggling to come out from their economic doldrums as is the current case 
for Zambia. Figure 3 below shows the per capita incomes of Malaysia compared to that 
of Zambia which was somewhat similar in the 1960s and 1970s but as both economies 
approached 1980s and afterwards, the gap has amazingly widened. 
Figure 3. Real GDP Per Capita, Malaysia and Zambia, 1960 to 2005
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Offiong and Ero (2002) in their paper, identified policies that have to do with 
technological advancement as one of the policies that most Southeast Asian countries 
implemented in their process of industrialization which subsequently led to the East 
Asian Miracle. They agued that the technological capabilities were achieved through the 
support for education particularly engineering and science education which provided 
intellectual infrastructure that facilitated technological transfer. Furthermore, science 
centers were promoted that offered services ranging from identifying new products to 
providing research and development (R&D) for firms that had no facilities of their own. 
Mainly R&D was provided to the SMEs that seemed to have no capacity to invest in 
R&D department that requires huge investments to be set up. The technological transfer 
was further enhanced by the industrial parks for high technology industries that were 
Source: WDI, World Bank, 2006 
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developed in countries like Malaysia. The technological development in these industrial 
parks trickled down to the suppliers mainly the SMEs. This transfer of technology to the 
SMEs made them become even more competitive that led them to graduate to larger 
enterprises. SMEs also benefited from the government subsidies mostly the cheap credit. 
Until now most Southeast Asian countries heavily subsidize their industries and provide 
different sorts of credit for their firms be it small or large.  
The most talked about policies that were implemented by the Southeast Asian 
countries during their economic take-off phase in the 1960s and early 1970s was the 
export-oriented industrialization. Some countries like Korea however implemented 
these policies in the 1960s whilst Malaysia implemented them in the early 1970s. Under 
this strategy, most policy objectives were aligned with or subjugated to the goal of 
export-promotion and their governments undertook a sequence of reforms of exchange 
rate, currency, budget and tax system policies. The governments introduced complex 
system of incentives to promote exports. Masuyama et al (2001) indicated that during 
this phase, Korean government deliberately concentrated on industries with relatively 
low capital requirements such as clothing and wigs which had favorable and rising 
international demand. The export performance in these countries worked well in 
overcoming the constraints of narrow domestic markets.   
On the other hand, Malaysia’s export-oriented industrialization was based on the 
export processing zones (EPZs), also through the Investment Incentives of 1968 and 
restriction on labor unionization to entice multinational corporations (MNCs) looking 
for low cost production abroad (Masuyama et al, 2001 ). EPZ status were given to firms 
that exported more than 80 percent of its products, or exported more than 50 percent of 
its products provided that they employed more than 350 full-time regular workers. As 
much as these export-oriented policies were successful in terms of gross export earnings 
and overall employment generation, they had serious drawbacks for sustained industrial 
expansion. One of the issues raised in the edited book by Masuyama et al (2001) was 
that linkages between EPZ firms and the rest of the economy through the purchase of 
domestically produced raw materials and capital equipment were insignificant, hence it 
become imperative for countries like Malaysia to re-focus on a second round of import 
substitution industrialization (ISI) based on heavy industries in the early 1980s which 
was also not so successful. Thereafter, Malaysian industrial development was guided by 
the ten-year Industrial development Plan (IMP 1, 1986 - 1995) which provided the 
framework for the development of the manufacturing sector. The IMP 1 promoted the 
processing of natural resources instead of exporting them in raw form. It also stressed 
the importance of science and technology and human resource development to support 
the industrialization process. During this period the 1968 Investment Incentives Act was 
 18
replaced by the 1986 Promotions of Investment Act that provided a wider range of 
incentives. Special incentives were targeted at export expansion and the development of 
SMEs that were deem essential to develop inter-industry linkages. SMEs that meet/met 
certain requirements are/were eligible for different kinds of grants, soft loans and 
incentives such as higher income tax threshold, pioneer status with full tax exemption 
for five years and investment tax allowance (offered to SMEs with at least 60% 
Malaysian equity). Following the expiry of IMP 1, the Industrial Master Plan 2 (IMP2. 
1996 – 2005) was then formulated which tried to broaden manufacturing capability 
through the strategies of cluster-based industrial development and manufacturing plus 
plus. The manufacturing plus plus is some sort of an integrated and coordinated 
approach to industrial development emphasizing on the full integration of 
manufacturing operations through the value chain to enhance industrial linkages and 
increase productivity and competitiveness.  Following the expiry of the IMP 2, the 
Industrial Master Plan 3 (IMP 3, 2006 – 2020) currently being implemented was 
formulated. It aims to further broaden the scope by including services and featuring 
functional targets such as SMEs, technology, marketing among others. These policies 
have to a large extent induced the industrial development in Malaysia for example, the 
MNCs in the electronics industry have spawned SMEs such as metal fabrication, tooling 
parts, mould and die production among others. These SMEs have graduated into 
multinational operations and some have formed joint-venture with foreign technology 
firms to produce high quality parts and equipment. It is evident that Malaysia had more 
in common with many developing countries than it did with the East Asian newly 
industrializing countries (NICs). Thus the lessons from Malaysia would be relevant to 
the debate on trade and industrial policy reforms in developing countries such as 
Zambia.  
Malaysia attaches a great importance as far as SME development is concerned. This 
is manifested by the forty (40) agencies in charge of SME promotion in Malaysia (Ohno, 
2006) and the more than thirty (30) funding agencies. Although the overseer of SMEs in 
Malaysia is the Small and Medium Industry Development Corporation (SMIDEC) an 
agency under the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). Like in most 
countries, SMEs accounts for 93.8% of all establishments in the manufacturing sector of 
Malaysia contributing about 27.3% manufacturing output, 25.8% value-added, 27.6% 
fixed assets and employing 38.9% (FMM Business Guide, 2003). The Malaysian SMEs 
industry has been growing at a steady rate, its development process has been interesting 
which maybe of interest to Zambia. Figure 4 below depicts a self-explained diagram 
showing different phases of enterprise development in Malaysia. 
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Figure 4: Phases of Development of Enterprises in Malaysia 
 
The success of the SMEs sector in Malaysia is evidenced by the growth rates in 
SMEs sub-industries. In all the sub-industries, SMEs have been performing well mainly 
due to the earlier mentioned industrial policies and also due to the specific SME 
development programmes that will be discussed later in this paper. Table 3 below shows 
its SMEs sub-industries’ average growth rates of output, capital and Labour in SMEs 
from 1982 to 2003 revealing a positive growth in all areas.  
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Table 3: SMEs sub-industries - Average growth rate of output, capital and Labour in 
SMEs from 1982 to 2003 
Industry Output Capital Labour 
Food 
Beverage & tobacco 
Textiles, wearing apparel & footwear 
Wood-based 
Plastic Products 
Rubber Products 
Chemical 
Metal products 
Non-metallic mineral products 
Electrical & electronics 
Transport equipment 
4.56 
2.15 
7.62 
4.26 
8.62 
5.08 
8.65 
17.00 
7.80 
7.92 
11.10 
0.37 
1.41 
8.62 
7.53 
11.52 
1.95 
10.19 
17.77 
5.04 
3.84 
10.96 
4.45 
3.09 
1.21 
0.87 
0.89 
0.05 
0.64 
4.91 
2.15 
1.60 
1.18 
Source: Idris and Rahmah, 2007 
The Malaysia’s SMEs sector is flourishing as shown by the above table, it is 
unarguably that countries struggling to develop their home grown industries learn from 
among other countries, Malaysia whose policies and programmes are working well in 
enhancing and facilitating the development of its SMEs. However, there is need to bear 
in mind that some of the programmes that are currently being implemented by the 
Malaysia may not be directed replicated to the Zambian environment. Malaysia is 
investing huge sums of money in terms of grants and soft loans among others, to 
support its SMEs sector that may not be easy for Zambia to replicate due to the different 
levels of economic development. Nevertheless, some programmes require little funding 
or no funding at all and are working very effective as regards to SMEs development in 
Malaysia. The following are some of the pro-SME programmes that were/are being 
implemented by Malaysia that could be adopted or adapted to the Zambian environment, 
extracted from the FMM Business Guide for Small and Medium-size Industries (2003): 
The Vendor Development Programme 
The Vendor Development Programme (VDP) is aimed at developing SMEs as a 
dynamic supporting industry to local large industries or Multinational Corporations 
(MNCs). The programme is implemented through tripartite arrangement between the 
Ministry in charge of entrepreneur development (lead agency), large industries (anchor 
companies) and financial institutions. This programme will indeed promote industrial 
linkages between SMEs and large corporations. The linkages will create industrial 
market as large industries appoint SMEs as their reliable vendors in components 
manufacturing and related supporting industries. Under the programme, large industries 
 21
too will provide guidance to the SMEs through technical and training facilities. 
Meanwhile financial institutions will render comprehensive financial package with 
related management and consultancy services to SMEs. A similar programme although 
not exactly is the one that is being implemented by Mozambique Aluminum Smelter 
(Mozal) through it Mozlink programme (BHP Billiton, 2004) which is responsible for 
the development of more than 200 SMEs in Mozambique. India on the other hand is 
also a success story as regards to implementing the VDP is concerned.  The VDP 
works well for MNCs who do not prefer to import parts and components from abroad as 
they implement modern management systems such as the “Just In Time” and the “Zero 
Inventory” in order to be globally competitive since transaction costs are greatly 
reduced. 
The Industrial Linkage Programme and Global Supplier Programme 
The Industrial Linkage Programme (ILP) aims to forge linkages between SMEs 
with large companies and MNCs. The programme facilitate market access and 
technology transfer to the SMEs. To encourage participation in this programme, specific 
incentives have been formulated to assist both large companies/MNCs and SMEs. These 
include tax deduction for expenses incurred by the large companies/MNCs in training 
the employees of vendors, product development and testing, and factory auditing to 
ensure the quality of vendors’ products. For participating SMEs they will be considered 
for pioneer status and investment tax allowance.  
The ILP requires participating SMEs to achieve competencies in supplying parts 
and components and services required by the MNCs. To assist the SMEs in acquiring 
the competencies, the Global Supplier Programme (GSP) was introduced in 1999. 
Under the programme, SMIDEC, in collaboration with the training institutions and 
MNCs, works out training modules necessary for the SMEs to acquire core 
competencies to supply parts and components and services. It aims to enhance the 
capacity and capability of SMEs as suppliers to MNCs. 
The Small Aggregation Initiative 
The Small Aggregation Initiative (SAI) is a Malaysian initiative that was proposed 
to Zambia for implementation through the Triangle of Hope initiative. SMEs wish to 
expand but they face numerous constraints such as lack of credit among others, however, 
even when they get funds, the new machinery and equipment they acquire sometimes 
are “too productive” for limited needs i.e. they may have a market for 100 pieces but the 
new machinery now produces 500 pieces. In such a situation the government or the 
private sector may come in to help. How do they do it? By selecting an industry group 
that has similar needs of machinery, but where the end products are different e.g. 
Manufacturer of wooden furniture such as bedroom furniture, dining room furniture, 
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cupboards kitchen furniture, office furniture etc., the initial machinery will be similar - 
sawing, planning, shaping etc only the end product / finishing section will be different. 
Therefore, the government or other coordinators selects within the industry group, 
manufacturer of non-competing products in this case the manufacturers of bedroom 
furniture, office furniture, kitchen cabinets etc. Bring them together to form a joint 
venture company for expansion / modernization purposes. If three companies are 
brought together - each can take 30% equity and the 10% held by the coordinators 
(government or the private sector). By merging the SMEs together, they acquire the 
strength of the medium scale industrialist and enjoy larger scale production advantages 
i.e. Purchase modern machinery / equipment (now the volume of production is not 
critical: - if each manufacturer needs only 1000 items and the machine can produce 
3000 or 4000 items), better negotiations of loans from banks, renting a bigger space, 
joint marketing etc. If foreign companies can form joint ventures with local investors 
for profit - why can’t locals do the same? 
Loans: Fund for Small and Medium Industries and New Entrepreneur Fund  
These programmes were aimed at promoting SME activities in export and domestic 
oriented sector and also to help stimulate growth of SMEs. The maximum interest rates 
were 5% p.a. with a maximum tenure of 3 to 5 years.  
The Enterprise 50 Award  
In the age of intense competition, local companies (SMEs inclusive) are faced with 
tremendous challenges to be competitive globally. The world market rules that only 
those who are capable of adjusting to the dynamic changes in the market place will 
survive – companies capable of positioning themselves for the future. Enterprise 50 was 
borne of a need to recognize such locally established businesses.  
5.    What Lessons Can Zambia Learn From the Southeast Asian Experience? 
In order to replicate the policies/programmes that were undertaken in Southeast 
Asian countries, undoubtedly Zambia needs some basic preconditions for economic 
take-off as evidenced in the Southeast Asian countries prior to their economic miracle. 
Preconditions such as strong and effective institutions, physical/social infrastructure, 
and stable political and macroeconomic environment would create the right business 
environment for private sector to flourish be it large or small.  
We have learnt that education facilitated the technological transfer that was cardinal 
for the East Asian Miracle. Why most Asian countries succeeded in their economic 
development was because they had an educated work force necessary for adapting the 
modern technology. Unless the entrepreneurs are trained or rather educated no matter 
how the technology may be brought into the country say by the MNCs, it will hardly 
trickle down to the SMEs. Upgrading the vocational centers and signing training 
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agreements between the SMEs and the vocational centers coupled with increased 
investments in research and development like was the case in Malaysia (the GSP) would 
go a long way in improving the skills and technological transfer to the Zambian SMEs. 
We have also observed that export oriented policies played a major role in driving 
the Southeast Asian economies. Zambia’s national industrial policy goal is to develop a 
competitive, export-led manufacturing sector that contributes 20% of GDP by 2015. 
This is a step in the right direction and as already discussed, Zambia is implementing 
the MFEZ much more similar to the EPZs that Malaysia and other Southeast Asian 
countries implemented during their industrialization process. However, we have learnt 
that the EPZs in Malaysia were not sustainable due to the fact that the linkages between 
EPZs and the domestic firms were insignificant or rather weak and hence Malaysia 
embarked on Promotions and Investments Act (1986) that emphasized on inter-industry 
linkages through SMEs development. Likewise, Zambia may consider introducing 
deliberate policies that will ensure linkages between the MFEZ firms and the SMEs 
which currently is not in place. I would have been pleased to see a clause in the ZDA 
Act (2006) that should compel the MFEZ firms to acquire a certain percentage of the 
raw materials and intermediate goods from the domestic market preferably the SMEs, 
however, this local content requirement violates the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
rules and considering the fact that Zambia is a member of WTO, this may not be 
feasible, therefore, the only hope remains in incentivizing the MNCs so that they are 
encouraged to create linkages with the SMEs (like the ILP) within the MFEZs.  
Talking about the export-oriented industries like those that will be established in the 
MFEZs, this will work well for a country like Zambia that has not only a small domestic 
market but also a relatively lower purchasing power. In fact MNCs wishing to invest in 
Zambia should not be looking at the domestic market but rather at a regional market that 
has a population of more than 350 million i.e. the Common Market of Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA) and Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) 
regions in which Zambia belongs to. Empirical evidence exists showing that the 
Zambian domestic market is not a factor that determines the inflows of FDI into Zambia 
(Chisala, 2006). Therefore, through the EPZs or MFEZs can Zambia attract more 
export-oriented FDI that in turn would boost the ancillary and supporting industries 
mostly the SMEs. Having said that, Zambia has to take note of the factors that led to the 
failure of most EPZs in Africa so as to avoid them. Lall and Pietrobell (2002) indicated 
that with an exception of Mauritius, hardly any African EPZs can be regarded as 
successful in terms of attracting FDI or stimulating exports and employment as most of 
them appear to fall short of best-practices standards. One of the solutions as seen from 
the Malaysian experience, is to integrate the EPZs with the domestic economy (large 
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and SMEs) and to increase the role of the private sector in zone development at the 
same time relaxing the bureaucratic and restrictive investment related policy 
frameworks. 
 Developing the SME sector through linkages will at a very great extent sustain the 
success of the MFEZ in Zambia as evident from the Malaysian automobile industry. 
The success of the Malaysian automobile industry which was once regarded as an 
“infant industry” lies in the linkages that were developed with the “Bumiputra” 
(indigenous) firms mainly the SMEs. Malaysia’s policy objective as regard to this 
industry was gradually to increase domestic value added from semi-knocked down 
(SKD) to completely knocked down (CKD) assembly and more substantial 
manufacturing activities with an increasing proportion of domestically made part and 
components thereby developing strong forward and backward linkages with the rest of 
the economy, and of course transfer of industrial technology. The first national car 
company that was launched in Malaysia, Perusahaan Otomobil Nasional (Proton) in 
1983 has provided the basis for development of local component industries (SMEs) as 
well as enhanced the utilization of local components. Since 1985, Proton, the first 
anchor firm in the VDP, has been aggressively developing and sourcing components 
from local vendors (SMEs). In 1992, Proton sponsored the formation of Proton Vendors 
Association to institutionalize linkages with and among different segments of local auto 
parts industry mainly SMEs. By 1995, a total of 138 local vendors had been developed 
that supplied more than 3,000 locally produced parts and components to national car 
projects. Another sector worth mentioning that has succeeded as regard to linkages 
between MNCs and SMEs in Malaysia is the electronics industry. Besides material 
production inputs, strong linkages between electronics MNCs and SMEs involved 
sourcing of indirect inputs, such as equipment and tools (e.g. jigs and fixtures). Local 
sourcing of indirect inputs developed, both through subcontracting arrangements and 
through arm’s length market purchases. As a result of these linkages, SMEs machine 
tools manufacturers have expanded from simple parts fabrication to high-precision 
tooling and production of fully automated systems, some of which were exported. 
Ismail’s (1999) study revealed that foreign electronics MNCs assisted local firms 
(SMEs inclusive) in beginning to manufacture parts that were previously imported, e.g. 
by providing local manufacturing with drawings and written specifications. In other 
words, MNCs have actively encouraged and supported local firms to acquire the 
technical capabilities needed to produce component parts. In some cases, MNCs 
engineers were seconded to local suppliers’ factories for up to two weeks to build 
capacity to the locals and in other cases, managers and employees of SMEs suppliers 
were invited to attend courses on quality control conducted by the MNCs. This is the 
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culture that needs to be developed between Zambian MNCs and the local firms more 
especially the SMEs. For additional lessons of developing linkages of large firms and 
SMEs, the Japanese automobile assemblers such as Toyota, Mitsubishi, Isuzu and 
Nissan could also provide good case studies with their keiretsu system of suppliers (see 
Buranathanung 1997).  
We have observed that linkages play a very critical role as regard to developing the 
home grown industries, the SMEs. However, we can not run away from their 
shortcomings, for example, following the expansion of the automobile assemblers in 
Malaysia, it became difficult for local parts makers to achieve economies of scale, as a 
result, local parts become expensive. This can be avoided if financial institutions (i.e. 
through the VDP) provide resources so that local suppliers can acquire more equipment 
and machinery to expand their production in accordance with the increased demand. In 
addition, through the technology transfer from MNCs to local suppliers (SMEs), we can 
expect high total factor productivities (TFP) exhibited by SMEs hence problems of 
meeting increased demands maybe offset. Shortcomings to do with market 
imperfections such as asymmetric information between the vendors and the anchor 
firms (agency problems) can mainly be avoided by “the community relationship” i.e. the 
spirit of mutual trust between/amongst the players involved (see Hayami, 2001).  
As discussed earlier, Zambia’s FDI outlook seems to be very bright. For the first 
time, since late 1980s, Zambia had a motor assembly industry launched by Tata Zambia 
in 2005. Tata Zambia spent US$3 million to revive the motor assembly plant, which is 
the only one in the country now that Rover Zambia in Ndola and Fiat in Livingstone 
ceased to assemble vehicles sometime back. However, linkages of local industries or 
rather the SMEs have not yet been developed with this automobile industry. Learning 
from the VDP, local firms could be identified as vendors, Tata (anchor firm) could 
therefore, transfer the skill and technology so that these firms produce components of 
acceptable international standards. For example, the garment manufacturing SMEs 
could be supplying materials for making seats whilst others in the metal fabrication 
could provide bolts and nuts etc. Furthermore, a Malaysian cellular phone 
manufacturing firm ‘M’ mobile in partnership with a local company Melcome is to 
establish a mobile phone assembly plant in Lusaka at a total investment out lay of US$3 
million and is expected to start operations later this year (Times of Zambia, 2008). Since 
this operation will be the first of its kind in Zambia hence capacity will need to be built 
for SMEs if they are to become vendors to this mobile industry. Only through the VDP 
can we expect forward and backward linkages to be created for the sustainability of the 
mobile industry in Zambia as it strives to become the hub for exports of cellular phones 
in the region. Another very critical sector that could revitalize the SME sector in Zambia 
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through development of linkages is the mining sector. The mining sector is the largest 
contributor to Zambia’s exports claiming 74% of total exports and it is one of the fastest 
growing sectors. Although Zambia is trying to diversify its economy from the traditional 
dependence on copper to other sectors, the mining sector has been booming in the 
recent years. In addition to the already existing mines that are currently being expanded, 
two more mines were recently opened namely the Kanshashi mine and Lumwana mine 
that is said to be the world’s biggest copper mine. These new mines are owned by 
MNCs, also the old mines after undergoing privatization they went into foreign hands – 
the MNCs. Concerns have arisen in the past that these MNCs tend to favor imported 
inputs at the expense of Zambian SMEs suppliers. Although there is a well-developed 
supplier network in Zambia, very little of the equipment supplied into the Zambian 
industry is locally manufactured, and most distributors have long-standing agreements 
with South African and to an extent European and Australian suppliers. Moreover, there 
is a strong foreign engineering presence in the country, which feeds into the mining and 
metals fabrication sector. Most local companies tend to operate at the 
services/maintenance end of the field, rather than at the actual manufacturing or 
fabrication end. The quality of local supplies can be an issue, therefore, this could 
mostly be resolved through programmes such as the VDP that can enhance the 
SMEs/local suppliers’ capabilities. Thanks to the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC), the private sector arm of the World Bank Group that launched a partnership with 
three leading mining firms in Zambia aimed at developing supply opportunities for local 
SMEs. The three partner mining firms are Mopani Copper Mines, First Quantum 
Mining and Operations Limited, and Kansanshi Mining Plc. Under this program called 
the Copperbelt Small and Medium Suppliers Development Program, IFC will help the 
three mining firms develop and increase the local involvement in their supply chains 
with an aim to mobilize, train, and support over 50 Zambian SMEs (IFC website, 2006). 
This is the step in the right direction as a number of SMEs will take advantage of the 
program to supply goods and services such as pumps and valves, protective wear, 
storage equipment, health and safety equipment, drilling equipment, consumables, metal 
fabrication, civil construction, and precision engineering among others. 
To divert a little bit from the scope of my study, other areas that seriously need to 
develop linkages with the SMEs is the services sector, mostly the retailers such as 
Shoprite, Game Stores etc. There have been reports that Shoprite sources its fresh 
vegetables and farm produce such as cabbage, potatoes, onions, tomatoes and eggs from 
South Africa when the same imports are abundantly available on the local market. 
Muneku (2003) in his paper reported that local small farmers have been complaining 
that Shoprite discriminates against local farm produce in preference of imported 
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produce distributed by its subsidiary Fresh mark. Surprisingly, Shoprite has a policy to 
support the local supply (Miller, 2005) but whether this policy is honored or not is a big 
question. Nevertheless, there have been some successes as regard to linkages between 
MNCs and SMEs, i.e. Zambian Breweries and Zambia Sugar both owned by South 
African firms have established links with the locals through out grower schemes. The 
locals supply sorghum in the case of Zambian Breweries (2,500 small scale farmers are 
involved) and sugar canes in the case of Zambia Sugar Company. In the agricultural 
sector, cotton and horticulture sub sectors have provided more links with the local 
producers where cotton and flower arrangements have been made with small individual 
farmers. Dunavant a United States MNC, buys approximately 57 percent of the national 
cotton crop, and has 100,000 out growers.    
Besides the strong linkages that were created amongst the enterprises, Malaysia, in 
its IMP 2 supported the cluster-based industrial development. The cluster-based 
industrial development or the industrial clusters are not only common in Malaysia but 
also to other Asian countries such as Thailand, Indonesia, China, India and Japan. In 
their research paper, Otsuka and Sonobe (2006) revealed that industrial clusters have 
made significant contribution to industrial development in East Asian countries. This 
strategy of industrial development is also gradually gaining its recognition in most 
African countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya and Ghana. Industrial clusters in Africa 
mainly consist of SMEs and are said to be very important as far as employment creation 
and poverty reduction are concerned (Ostuka, 2006). Being in a cluster offsets some of 
the constraints regularly faced by SMEs. If transacting parties are located near each 
other, transport costs are saved, transaction costs due to imperfect market contract 
enforcement are lowered, and good products and superior production practices diffuse 
quickly. Thus, industrial clusters generates agglomeration benefits such as division of 
labor among enterprises, the development of the market for skilled workers, and the 
dissemination of technical and managerial knowledge (see Sonobe et al, 2006). Very 
few clusters, if any, can be observed in Zambia. Therefore, Zambia could identify the 
few clusters that are available and start helping them to upgrade by providing them with 
more space, support activities leading to innovation by means of providing training 
programs for technological, managerial and marketing advancement (e.g. through the 
VDP). Furthermore, encouraging the SMEs’ employees to start their own enterprises. 
Since profit-seeking private enterprises have little incentive to encourage their trained 
employees to start their own business, the public sector should provide facilities that 
serve as incubators for future entrepreneurs. On the other hand, training of SMEs in a 
cluster will stimulate multi-faceted innovations which in turn encourage growth for the 
clusters. In Ethiopia, clusters are succeeding especially in the shoe industry mainly 
 28
because of the tendency by Ethiopian entrepreneurs’ frequent visits to Italy to learn 
designs, production methods and marketing skills (Sonobe et al, 2006). The same 
success is prevailing in Bangladesh’s huge garment cluster that learns and adapts 
technology and management know how from Korea (Sonobe et al, 2006).  
Regarding the Small Aggregation Initiative (SAI), creating joint ventures amongst 
local SMEs is a brilliant idea as they would take advantage of scale economies and 
share the risks involved in conducting their businesses among others. SMEs in Zambia 
fail to win government tenders mostly due to low production capacities, hence merging 
the SMEs that produce similar products would enhance their productivities and take 
advantage of the public tenders which most likely will also be facilitated by the 
introduction of Zambia’s Citizen’s Economic Empowerment Initiative that will aim at, 
among others, giving special preferences to SMEs in terms of giving out public tenders. 
The SAI aims at striking a balance or rather an equilibrium in terms of production and 
the market demand. Hence it is important that SMEs operate efficiently so that they 
neither under-produce nor over-produce in accordance with the market availability.  
Learning from the Enterprise 50 Award, Zambia could come up with a “Minister’s 
Award” that would be recognizing the best SME’s performers in terms of production, 
quality control and job creation. This definitely could be a motivating factor to the 
SMEs community. 
As for the loans, Zambia may need to put in place a revolving fund for SME 
Development with very minimal interest rates. This may go a long way to improve the 
current status of the SMEs as they are mostly constrained by credit which in turn also 
limits their entrepreneurship innovations. It may also lessen the SMEs’ competition of 
securing loans from commercial banks and in return this may induce lower lending rates 
by the banks. Nevertheless, the Zambian government has tried to reduce borrowing 
from commercial banks to as low as 1.2% of GDP in hope of making more money 
available for lending to the private sector at reduced interest rates, alas interest rates 
have remained as high as 27% which is practically not viable for a small entrepreneurs 
who would want to venture into manufacturing or agricultural activities. For traders this 
maybe affordable as they would buy their commodities and resell them in a shortest 
period possible and reap some profits. Therefore, in order to revive its manufacturing 
base, the Zambia remains with no choice but to intervene.     
Well, having analyzed and recommended various policies and programmes, the next 
question that any reader must be asking himself/herself is whether these policies and 
programmes are feasible in Zambia. The simple answer I would give is a “YES”, they 
are indeed feasible due the fact that there exist both political and bureaucratic will in 
Zambia. On the political will, this is evident by the commitment of the current 
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government to improve the status of Zambian people by luring more investments for job 
and wealth creation and also by getting involved in programmes targeted at private 
sector development. Currently the Head of State in Zambia and his ministers participate 
in what are called the Zambia International Business Advisory Council (ZIBAC) 
meetings that are held once every year. ZIBAC aims to draw government and the 
private sector in closer working relations to foster economic development. Furthermore, 
the implementation of the already discussed Citizens Economic Empowerment Act 
(2006) is a clear manifestation of the commitment by the government to address 
problems that are currently faced by the SMEs. 
Besides the Head of State being actively involved in the private sector development, 
some notable parliamentarians are also eager to bring development in Zambia while the 
bureaucrats try as much as possible to come up with good policies for implementation. 
Therefore, this commitment and partnership of the public sector (politicians), the private 
sector and the civil servants (bureaucrats) together provides a “triangle of hope” for 
implementing good economic policies and programmes for wealth creation and 
betterment of the Zambian economy. 
6. Conclusion 
Empirical studies have shown that the manufacturing sector in Africa of which more 
than 80% consists SMEs, is stagnant. The issue at hand for Africa, Zambia in particular, 
is to come up with a mix of policies and strategies for unlocking this very important 
sector so that it performs at the frontier and in return contributes to poverty reduction 
and economic growth. But the question lies in finding the right “key” to be used in 
unlocking the SME sector. Learning from other countries such as those in Southeast 
Asia who have developed their economies through vibrant SMEs as one of their 
strategies, Zambia could apply some of the practical policies and programmes that were 
implemented as it strives to meet the UN MDGs and also realizing its vision of 
becoming a middle income country by 2030.   
Zambia has not yet experienced an economic take-off, however some pre-conditions 
needed for taking off seem to be bright as it is currently enjoying a favorable and stable 
political and macroeconomic environment evidenced by an economic growth of more 
than 5% for the past 6 years, a stable exchange rate and a single digit inflation rate for 
the first time in more than 40 years. This might be the right time to take advantage of 
the good political and macroeconomic climate and start implementing effective policies 
that countries in Southeast Asia implemented during their take-off so that the economic 
benefits can start trickling down to the poor people on the ground. 
As evidenced by the outlined programmes that were implement in Malaysia in 
chapter 5, we have learnt that whilst direct support measures (e.g. grants and soft loans) 
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may be justified to address areas of demonstrated market failures or social objectives, it 
is important to recognize that they are only one of the variety of ways in which 
government can influence the ability of SMEs to survive and grow. Supporting 
industrial clusters and creating linkages between MNCs and SMEs facilitates training, 
education, R&D, technology transfer, innovation and creates a platform for financial 
support hence Zambia should focus implementing policies and programmes that 
encourage linkages of its SME sector with larger firms by learning from Southeast 
Asian countries more especially that it is currently receiving huge FDI inflows and also 
with the coming of the MFEZs which will stimulate more FDI inflows. These measures 
once undertaken will create employment, wealth and finally, reverse Zambia’s economic 
deterioration while accelerating growth. 
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